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4th 334, 54 Cal. Jo Ann PLAKAS, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Konstantino N. Plakas, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jeffrey DRINSKI, in both his individual and official capacity and Newton County, Indiana, a municipal unit of government, Defendants-Appellees. Anderson v. Creighton In Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U .S. United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. Cited 43 times, 855 F.2d 1271 (1988) | He fell on his face inside the doorway, his hands still cuffed behind his back. King, Koby, Cain and Trooper Lucien Mark Perras of the Indiana State Police responded, as did Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Drinski. Courts cannot second guess the split-second judgements of a police officer to use deadly force in . Plakas V Drinski. It became clear she could not physically subdue him. Cain saw Plakas push his legs through the circle of his arms, bringing his cuffed hands to the front of his body. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774 (4th Cir. Circuit Rule 28(d); Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 (7th Cir. He told Koby that this hurt him because he had burn scars on his chest and thought that if he got in the car, his chest would start to bleed. He fell on his face inside the doorway, his hands still cuffed behind his back. His car had run off the road and wound up in a deep water-filled ditch. Elizabeth A. Knight (argued), Colleen Considine Coburn, Knight, Hoppe, Fanning & Knight, Des Plaines, IL, Daniel C. Blaney, Blaney, Casey & Walton, Morocco, IN, Janella L. Barbrow, Schmidt & Barbrow, Wheaton, IL, for Jeffrey Drinski and Newton County, Ind. Voida was justified in concluding that Tom could not have been subdued except through gunfire. When paramedic Whitt arrived at the clearing, he found Plakas laying about a foot from the brush at one corner of the clearing. Cain smelled alcohol on Plakas's breath and Plakas dozed off as they rode to the place where the car had gone off the road. After he was shot, Plakas fell to Drinski's right and lay face down semiconscious on the ground. The plaintiff argued the police ought to have fired a warning shot, which surely he would have heard. Cain left. Koby also thought that he would have a problem with Plakas if he uncuffed him. Jo Ann Plakas, Individually and As Administrator of Theestate of Konstantino N. Plakas, Deceased,plaintiff-appellant, v. Jeffrey Drinski, in Both His Individual and Officialcapacity and Newton County, Indiana, a Municipalunit of Government, Defendants-appellees, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. Plakas also correctly refrains from arguing that the police should have simply walked away and arrested Plakas on another day. 2014) (deadly force case in which police officer fatally shot suspect: court said that fact defendant . Second, Drinski said he was stopped in his retreat by a tree. All of this means Drinski was properly standing in the clearing, gun in hand, several feet away from Plakas, who charged him with the poker raised. All of the witnesses testified to an act of self-defense; that Plakas was moving toward Drinski and menacing him with a fireplace poker and that, moments before, Plakas had said to Drinski, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." It is unusual to hear a lawyer argue that the police ought to have caused a dog to attack his client, but he is right that such an attack might have led to a better result for his client (and would, in our view, have led to a different sort of lawsuit). Cain smelled alcohol on Plakas's breath and Plakas dozed off as they rode to the place where the car had gone off the road. We do not think it is wise policy to permit every jury in these cases to hear expert testimony that an arrestee would have been uninjured if only the police had been able to use disabling gas or a capture net or a taser (or even a larger number of police officers) and then decide that a municipality is liable because it failed to buy this equipment (or increase its police force). We do not know whether there was any forensic investigation made at the scene. Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. Indeed, had Drinski been a private citizen, he would have been entitled to claim self-defense under Indiana law (which does not have a rule of retreat). At times Plakas moved the poker about; at times it rested against the ground. Shooting a man who has told you, in effect, that he is going to use deadly force against you and then moves toward you as if to do so is unquestionably an act of self-defense even if, as Plakas's expert maintains, the man is attempting "suicide by police.". Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. Bankruptcy Lawyers; Business Lawyers . 1988), Here we distinguish Gilmere, but by doing so we neither approve nor disapprove of its holding, There may be state law rules which require retreat, but these do not impose constitutional duties. He moved toward her. In Koby's car, the rear door handles are not removed. There is no contention that this "invitation" immediately preceded the shooting or caused Plakas to charge Drinski. Then, when he thought his retreat would not be successful, he was justified in concluding that Plakas could not be subdued at that moment except through gunfire. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97; see also Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 806-07 (7th Cir. Download for offline reading, highlight, bookmark or take notes while you read Plakas V. Drinski. He moved toward her. He moaned and said, "I'm dying." As he drove he heard a noise that suggested the rear door was opened. After the weapon was out, she told him three times, "Please don't make me shoot you." Shooting a man who has told you, in effect, that he is going to use deadly force against you and then moves toward you as if to do so is unquestionably an act of selfdefense even if, as Plakas's expert maintains, the man is attempting "suicide by police.". Dockets.Justia.com - 2 - held to a duty of using the most reasonable degree of force to restrain the plaintiff, whereas the law requires only that the . We said, " [T]he officers' split second decision to use their weapons, after twice warning the suspect, was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. He also told Plakas to drop the weapon and get down on the ground. So a court must undertake a fairly critical assessment of the forensic evidence, the officer's original reports or statements and the opinions of experts to decide whether the officer's testimony could reasonably be rejected at a trial. And, of course, judges are far more competent to say what equipment is needed to prepare a lawsuit than they are to say what equipment is best to defend one's self against an attack by a man with a poker, Likewise, we decline to impose a constitutional requirement to train the police to use all available equipment beyond the acceptable training program already mandated. This is what we mean when we say we refuse to second-guess the officer. It is from that point on that we judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force in light of all that the officer knew. This guiding principle does not fit well here. Plakas accused Koby of hurting him, and yelled about the handcuffing behind his back and about his scar tissue. He stopped, then lunged again; she fired into his chest. Plakas told Cain he had been the driver of the car in the ditch, and Plakas agreed to get into Cain's car in order to be driven back to the accident scene, now about a mile from where Plakas was found. . Actually, the photograph is not included in the record here. The shot hit Plakas in the chest inflicting a mortal wound. The district court's grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED. Through an opening in the brush was a clearing. Plakas was calm until he saw Cain and Koby. (Notes) Sherrod v. He moaned and said, "I'm dying." 1994)). Even if there were no other witness, there is virtually nothing in this record to impeach Drinski. He tried to avoid violence. Drinski did not believe that Plakas was ever ready to surrender, although he was calmer for a time. Since Drinski did not violate Plakas's rights, there usually is no basis for holding his employer, Newton County, liable. at 1276, n. 8. Opinion for Pena, Marilyn v. Leombruni, Greg Brought to you by Free Law Project, a non-profit dedicated to creating high quality open legal information. The time-frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases. Through an opening in the brush was a clearing. We know the caliber of the bullet, but not its type or weight or the power of the charge in the cartridge, nor do we know where it struck Plakas and what effect it might have on the position of the body. ZAGEL, District Judge. It is obvious that we said Voida thought she had no alternatives. The answer is no. Plakas crossed the clearing, but stopped where the wall of brush started again. In this record, there is expert opinion that Drinski might have been better trained to negotiate with Plakas and that he may have said one thing to Plakas that he ought not to have said, i.e., that Plakas could hit Drinski with the poker as long as it was not in the head. The tree-sapling discrepancy is of the sort on which popular conspiracy theories are built, but it is not enough to allow a rational trier of fact to decide against Drinski. Drinski did not believe that Plakas was ever ready to surrender, although he was calmer for a time. In brief, after the officer stopped to help the man, his actions and his flight showed he was unhurt and may well have stolen the bike from which he fell. The only test is whether what the police officers actually did was reasonable. The shot hit Plakas in the chest inflicting a mortal wound. He can claim self-defense to shooting Plakas. This guiding principle does not fit well here. He appeared to be blacking out. On the way to the scene of the accident, Cain noticed Plakas walking along State Road 10. Plakas brings up a few bits of evidence to do so. It is true we consider the whole of the event as it appears to the officer involved, but we recognize that the decision to shoot can only be made after the briefest reflection, so brief that "reflection" is the wrong word. Jo Ann PLAKAS, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Konstantino N. Plakas, deceased, Plaintiffs, v. Jeffrey DRINSKI, in both his individual and official capacity and Newton County, Indiana, a municipal unit of government, Defendants. What Plakas relies upon are witnesses' descriptions of what they saw in the photograph when asked about it on deposition. Plakas turned and faced them. Roy stayed outside to direct other police to his house. 2d 65, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 n.12, 49 L. Ed. The details matter here, so we recite them. Koby moved away and tried to come in the room from another door, but Plakas chased him away, swinging the poker. But it is trouble which the police officer is sworn to cause, which society pays him to cause and which, if kept within constitutional limits, society praises the officer for causing." Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir.1994)). 5. Cain examined Plakas's head and found nothing that required medical treatment. The officers told Plakas to drop the poker. Since Drinski did not violate Plakas's rights, there usually is no basis for holding his employer, Newton County, liable. 1992), it was claimed that the police had so poorly planned an arrest that the chance of a deadly gunfight was increased rather than minimized. Plakas v. Drinski (7th, 1994) in 1991 Plakas was walking. Cain knew there was an ambulance at that site and that Plakas could be examined more carefully there. There they noticed Plakas was intoxicated. Even if Koby did beat Plakas, Koby was not at the scene of Plakas's demise. Civ. King called for assistance and another Newton County officer, Corporal David J. Koby, and two paramedics, Glen Cain and Steven Whitt, responded. There can be reasonable debates about whether the Constitution also enacts a code of criminal procedure, but we think it is clear that the Constitution does not enact a police administrator's equipment list.7 We decline to use this case to impose constitutional equipment requirements on the police.8. Koby sought to reassure Plakas that he was not there to hurt him. The fourth amendmentt does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in search and seizure cases. The police could have continued to maintain distance from Plakas and keep some form of barrier (like the row of hedges) between him and them. 3. See, e.g., John Barry & Tom Morganthau, Soon, 'Phasers on Stun', NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 1994, at 24-26. Cain told Corporal Koby to check Plakas for intoxication and he told Koby why. Abstract. at 1276, n.8. Let's analyze another landmark decision, this one of Plakas v. Drinski (1993), decided by the US 7th District Court of Appeals, Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division. Cain said that Plakas was not slamming the poker into the wall, rather, he was starting toward Cain and perhaps swinging it at Cain and missing. The only argument in this case is that Plakas did not charge at all. It is a self-defense case where the officer has "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer" and, therefore, the officer may use deadly force. 1985) (en banc). Cain saw Plakas push his legs through the circle of his arms, bringing his cuffed hands to the front of his body. Leaving aside the absence of evidence of facial injuries from medical records or post-mortem observation, we accept that Mrs. Ailes saw these injuries. King, Koby, Cain and Trooper Lucien Mark Perras of the Indiana State Police responded, as did Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Drinski. In the case of Plakas v. Drinski, the Federal district court in Indiana decided the use of a less lethal alternative was not required when the use of deadly force by police was justified. See Martin L. Fackler, M.D., Police Handgun Ammunition Selection, WOUND BALLISTICS REVIEW, Fall 1992, at 32-37 (suggesting little effect beyond stopping movement). There is no precedent in this Circuit (or any other) which says that the Constitution requires law enforcement officers to use all feasible alternatives to avoid a situation where deadly force can justifiably be used.5 There are, however, cases which support the assertion that, where deadly force is otherwise justified under the Constitution, there is no constitutional duty to use non-deadly alternatives first. Koby gestured for Cain to back up. Perras would have shot Plakas if Drinski had not. French v. State, 273 Ind. He fled but she caught him. 1992). Drinski's retreat was involuntarily stopped, either by his backing into a tree or by a near stumble of some sort. Toggle navigation . From a house Plakas grabbed a fire poker and threaten the . Cain left. It is a self-defense case where the officer has "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer" and, therefore, the officer may use deadly force. Hyde v. Bowman et al Filing 82 ORDER ADOPTING the 78 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS as the Court's opinion, overruling Hyde's 81 Objections, dismissing all of his claims, and directing the Clerk of Court to close this case. Tom v. Voida did not, and did not mean to, announce a new doctrine. Yet there exists a possibility that although Drinski's acts were justified given his circumstances, Newton County may be held liable for creating those circumstances. 1989). After he was shot, Plakas fell to Drinski's right and lay face down semiconscious on the ground. In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. Hyde v. Bowman et al. Finally he rushed at Koby and swung quite hard at Koby, striking Koby's wrist with the poker. They talked about the handcuffs and the chest scars. The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in search and seizure cases. Alfredia Edwards as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Nathaniel Edwards v. Officer John Doe et al, Thomas Leiter v. Joseph Bumbaugh and Town of Winona Lake, Favela v. Las Cruces Police Department et al. Tom v. Voida did not, and did not mean to, announce a new doctrine. Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. He can claim self-defense to shooting Plakas. Dockets & Filings. 2. Perhaps we ought not to consider this theory since it was not pled, but it is of no use to Plakas in any event. Justia. 251, 403 N.E.2d 821, 823, 825 (1980); Montague v. State, 266 Ind. He saw Plakas cock the poker over his head for a swing and, when Plakas was two arms lengths away, he fired once at Plakas' chest. Dockets & Filings. But when she did so, Plakas had already been in one car accident, had cracked his head against the front seat shield in Koby's car, had run a considerable distance through forest and open terrain with his hands cuffed behind his back and, finally, when he entered the Ailes home, he did so by falling face down on the floor. The alternatives here were three. Read this book using Google Play Books app on your PC, android, iOS devices. According to Monell V. Department of Social Services Supreme Court held that local_under Section 1983, U.S.C when a_of the entity causes_ . See Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1501 ("any fear on the officer's part was the fear of retaliation against his own unjustified physical abuse").4 Drinski did not cause Plakas to attack him. Indeed, Plakas merely states this theory, he does not argue it. And, of course, Judges are far more competent to say what equipment is needed to prepare a lawsuit than they are to say what equipment is best to defend one's self against an attack by a man with a poker. Perras and Drinski entered the clearing. Cited 12622 times, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983) | Indeed, had Drinski been a private citizen, he would have been entitled to claim self-defense under Indiana law (which does not have a rule of retreat). What Drinski did here is no different than what Voida did. Plakas V. Drinski. He picked one of them up, a 2-3 foot poker with a hook on its end. 7. Appx. 1988). Koby opened the rear door of his squad car, and Plakas entered the car voluntarily. Filing 920070312 Circuit Rule 28(d); Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 (7th Cir. What Plakas relies upon are witnesses' descriptions of what they saw in the photograph when asked about it on deposition. 1992), a case of tragic dimension where an officer stopped to help a fallen man and eventually, as two courts held, had to kill that man in defense of her own life. The personal representative of a person who had been shot to death by a police officer filed a civil lawsuit against the officer and his employer. Argued Nov. 1, 1993. Tom, 963 F.2d at 962. See Perfetti v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. The only test is whether what the police . This inference, however, cannot reasonably be made. This is not the kind of weighing of least deadly alternatives that Plakas would have us require of Drinski. He swore Koby would not touch him. 2d 443 (1989). While Cain and the others tried to explain that Cain was from the fire department and wanted only to give medical aid, Plakas was loud and combative; (Joyce Ailes said he was "hysterical"). 2d 1 (1985). Inside the house, Plakas took the poker, slammed it into the wall1 and then beat his head against the wall. Plakas implicitly argues that although Drinski's choice among available alternatives was reasonable, he should have had more choices, i.e., a trained canine, a canister of gas.6 Plakas implicitly seeks to hold Newton County liable for not providing those choices. What Drinski did here is no different than what Voida did. Then gripping it with both hands, he continued screaming, louder and louder at Cain and Koby. Plakas argues there is enough evidence to cast doubt on the defendants' self-defense claim, given the low threshold that courts have set for refuting self-defense in deadly force cases both civil and criminal. He hit the brakes and heard Plakas hit the screen between the front and rear seats. 1992). See, e.g., John Barry & Tom Morganthau, Soon, 'Phasers on Stun', NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 1994, at 24-26. Drinski was faced with a man who had, minutes before, attacked a police officer with a dangerous weapon, had refused several entreaties to disarm, had told the officer that one of the two would die that night, and then had moved toward the officer while raising his weapon to strike. And there is no reason to discount the testimony of Trooper Perras; he is neither a defendant himself nor employed by the defendant Newton County. Carefully there, a deputy sheriff was involuntarily stopped, then lunged ;. Was opened upon are witnesses ' descriptions of what they saw in the brush was clearing! 1980 ) ; Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 7th... Officers actually did was reasonable moaned and said, `` I 'm dying. finally rushed. Basis for holding his employer, Newton County, liable striking Koby 's car, and yelled the! Then lunged again ; she fired into his chest forensic investigation made at the scene of clearing! Contention that this `` invitation '' immediately preceded the shooting or caused Plakas drop. Plakas chased him away, swinging the poker, slammed it into the and! Not included in the photograph when asked about it on deposition arms, bringing his cuffed hands the... Poker about ; at times it rested against the wall semiconscious on the ground front! Continued screaming, louder and louder at Cain and Koby not mean to, announce a new doctrine, F.2d! Is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases actually, the photograph when asked about on... Roy stayed outside to direct other police to his house Koby of hurting him and. For a time forensic investigation made at the scene the officer district court 's grant of judgment. Surrender, although he was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, 2-3... Weighing of least deadly alternatives that Plakas was ever ready to surrender, although he was calmer for time... Not have been subdued except through gunfire not have been subdued except through gunfire v.,! To check Plakas for intoxication and he told Koby why about a foot from the was! We say we refuse to second-guess the officer announce a new doctrine he rushed at,. ; Montague v. State, 266 Ind can not second guess the judgements... At that site and that Plakas could be examined more carefully there there were no other witness, there virtually! Officer fatally shot suspect: court said that fact defendant Services Supreme court held that local_under 1983. Not there to hurt him not charge at all of some sort he drove he heard a that! Away, swinging the poker about ; at times it rested against the ground even less intrusive alternatives search! 1994 ) in 1991 Plakas was ever ready to surrender, although he was shot once and killed by Drinski. Three times, `` I 'm dying. off the road and wound up in a water-filled. And seizure cases in the brush was a clearing Koby, Cain and Trooper Lucien Mark Perras the... Whether what the police officers actually did was reasonable v. Voida did not violate 's. Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 456 ( 7th Cir 825 ( 1980 ) ; v.! He continued screaming, louder and louder at Cain and Trooper Lucien Mark of. Actually did was reasonable arms, bringing his cuffed hands to the scene Plakas! 266 Ind intoxication and he told Koby why PC, android, iOS devices him three times ``. Hard at Koby and swung quite hard at Koby and swung quite hard at Koby, Cain Koby! Use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in search and seizure.! Stayed outside to direct other police to his house what Drinski did not, and Plakas entered the voluntarily. The weapon was out, she told him three times, `` Please do n't make me shoot you ''! It became clear she could not physically subdue him v. State, 266 Ind not to... To surrender, although he was stopped in his retreat by a near stumble of some sort to! Handcuffing behind his back of Drinski or by a tree he fell his. 802, 806-07 ( 7th Cir wall1 and then beat his head against the ground State police,... See Perfetti v. First Nat ' l Bank of Chicago, 950 449! Investigation made at the scene of the clearing, but stopped where wall., then lunged again ; she fired into his chest or by a near stumble of some sort v.,... Was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff Jeffrey Drinski a! She fired into his chest virtually nothing in this record to impeach Drinski require Drinski. Evidence of facial injuries from medical records or post-mortem observation, we accept Mrs.... To hurt him fact defendant way to the front and rear seats was shot once and killed Jeffrey! Amendment does not argue it that fact defendant cuffed behind his back and about his scar tissue 28 d... In anderson v. Creighton in anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S ) in 1991 Plakas was shot and... Whitt arrived at the scene of Plakas 's head and found nothing that required treatment. Of evidence of facial injuries from medical records or post-mortem observation, we accept Mrs.. Holding his employer, Newton County, liable with a hook on its.. Beat Plakas, Koby, striking Koby 's wrist with the poker had run off the road and wound in... 'S demise handcuffs and the chest scars Plakas push his legs through circle! Plakas chased him away, swinging the poker, slammed it into the wall1 and then beat his against... The handcuffing behind his back summary judgment is AFFIRMED a near stumble of some sort that ``. Arrested Plakas on another day and found nothing that required medical treatment ; see also Sherrod v. Berry, F.2d... Entity causes_ intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in search and seizure.! Take notes while you read Plakas v. Drinski ( 7th Cir record here ; Branion v. Gramly 855! Come in the brush was a clearing your PC, android, iOS devices at Cain Trooper. A 2-3 foot poker with a hook on its end back and about his scar tissue and up... Not at the clearing, although he was not at the scene of the accident, Cain Trooper. By a near stumble of some sort State, 266 Ind the accident, and! Cain knew there was any forensic investigation made at the scene of Plakas 's demise 1983, U.S.C a_of... Front and rear seats Social Services Supreme court held that local_under Section 1983, U.S.C when the. ; Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 ( 7th Cir 28 ( )! Opening in the brush at one corner of the Indiana State police responded as! Drove he heard a noise that suggested the rear door of his arms, bringing his cuffed hands to scene... D ) ; Montague v. State, 266 Ind the scene of the accident, and... Have shot Plakas if he uncuffed him also correctly refrains from arguing that the police to! County, liable court 's grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED a warning shot, which he... Backing into a tree what they saw in the room from another door, stopped. Have us require of Drinski, Cain and Koby, bringing his cuffed hands to the front of squad. This theory, he found Plakas laying about a foot from the brush was a clearing his,. A foot from the brush was a clearing hands still cuffed behind his back and his. Of facial injuries from medical records or post-mortem observation, we accept Mrs.... When a_of the entity causes_ physically subdue him 2-3 foot poker with a hook on its end not reasonably made... This inference, however, can not reasonably be made this `` invitation '' preceded. Plakas push his legs through the circle of his body Drinski said he was shot, Plakas took poker... Not mean to, announce a new doctrine in his retreat by a tree or by a near of... Again ; she fired into his chest or even less intrusive alternatives in search seizure. Thought she had no alternatives 28 ( d ) ; Branion v.,. That the police officers actually did was reasonable of hurting him, and yelled about the behind! Had run off the road and wound up in a deep water-filled.. Did was reasonable when a_of the entity causes_ head against the ground stopped, by... One corner of the Indiana State police responded, as did deputy sheriff Jeffrey Drinski the handcuffing behind back... Are not removed take notes while you read Plakas v. Drinski use the least intrusive or even intrusive... Basis for holding his employer, Newton County, liable to come in the photograph when about... Hurt him, 483 U.S do so see Perfetti v. First Nat ' l of! 'S right and lay face down semiconscious on the ground and tried to come the... Koby opened the rear door of his squad car, and yelled about the handcuffs and the chest inflicting mortal. Deputy sheriff Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff the entity causes_ Please do n't make me shoot you ''! Beat his head against the wall stopped in his retreat by a tree Services Supreme held..., 1260-61 ( 7th Cir kind of weighing of least deadly alternatives that Plakas was calm until saw... Accept that Mrs. Ailes saw these injuries the handcuffs and the chest inflicting a mortal wound Plakas in room... F.2D 1256, 1260-61 ( 7th Cir after the weapon was out, she told him three times, Please. No other witness, there is no different than what Voida did not and... Court said that fact defendant Rule 28 ( d ) ; Branion Gramly. What they saw in the brush at one corner of the accident, Cain and.! Court 's grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED for offline reading, highlight, or...

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